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The Art of Interpretation in Future
Interest Cases
Daniel M. Schuyler*
Interpretation is one of the most difficult tasks confronting the
lawyer or judge. Future interest cases present challenging and re-
curring problems of interpretation. The author here discusses the
elements, methods, and problems of interpretation. Although the dis-
cussion is set in the context of future interests cases, many of the
authors remarks are applicable to interpretation in general.
I. A GLANCE AT OBJECTiVES
A. The Human Quest for Understanding
Man's quest for an absolute, for a definition of "good," for the
meaning of "justice," carries us back to the beginnings of philosophy.
And although these concepts are as elusive as the Questing Beast
pursued by King Pellinore in T. H. White's delightful book, The
Once and Future King, the history of mankind indicates that the
curiosity of thoughtful persons is insatiable and that the search will
not end. It continues daily before our eyes-in mathematics, astrono-
my, medicine, psychology, sociology, economics, philosophy, and
other disciplines not the least of which is law. Even Holmes, the
supposed skeptic, who rejected absolutes' and who denied the inter-
mixture of law and morals,2 repeatedly affirmed the significance of
intellectual achievement 3 and thought it "not improbable that man,
* A.B., 1934, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1937, Northwestern University School of
Law; member of the Illinois and Wisconsin Bars; Professor of Law, Northwestern
University.
1. Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1915). "With absolute truth
I leave absolute ideals of conduct equally on one side."
2. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 H~nv. L. REv. 457, 464 (1897). "For my own
part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance
could be banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted which should
convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law." Others have of course
disagreed. See, e.g., GRAY, ThE NATURE AND SouRCES OF ThE LAW § 310 (1909).
"But on the definition of 'Jurisprudence,' which appears the sounder one, the true
grounds of morality seem a proper subject of contemplation." CAanozo, THE NATURE
or THE JuDicuL PNocEss 133-34 (1921). "What really matters is this, that the judge
is under a duty, within the limits of his power of innovation, to maintain a relation
between law and morals, between the precepts of jurisprudence and those of reason
and good conscience." Despite his unwillingness to relate law and morals, Holmes
far from rejected idealism. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HAv.
L. REv. 443, 462 (1899). "But it is an ideal, and without ideals what is life worth?"
3. See, e.g., Homns, The Profession of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 29,
32 (1886); Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 2, at 478. "Read the works of




like the grub that prepares a chamber for the winged thing it has
never seen but is to be-that man may have cosmic destinies that
he does not understand."4
Whether or not it is given to us to "catch an echo of the infinite,
and though we may be denied the barest glimpse of the unknown, it
seems a true observation that the cumulative effect of unveiling tiny
parts of the inscrutable whole have at last put us on a course toward
the stars. By the same token we may hope, though of course we
cannot be sure, that persistent efforts at improving small segments of
the vast structure of the law-the human attempt more closely to
approach justice-may lead toward the ultimate goal, though it may
never be precisely envisioned. Thus, for reviewing once again prob-
lems not solved by giants of times gone by, no apology is tendered.
B. "Certainty Generally is Illusion, and Repose
Is Not the Destiny of Man."6
In one sense the quest for the absolute may be said to be an
expression of the human longing for certainty. It is not strange,
therefore, that periods of extreme formalism have characterized the
development of the law or that great expositors of the law should
have insisted that the judges did not make law but were in effect
merely discoverers of fundamental truths.7 The same is no doubt true
of the doctrine of stare decisis which may well be founded in sub-
stantial part upon the desire for repose. Whatever the case, the high
degree of rigidity and resistance to sudden change which has marked
the history of the law of future interests and imparted to it a higher
degree of certainty than is elsewhere discernible8 may well account
for the almost passionate interest lavished upon it by those who have
become its devotees. Accept the premises even for a moment, and
the illusion of certainty is very apt to seize you.
Yet, despite its painful growth, even the law of future interests
has not been immune to revolutionary change. The Statute of Uses 9
(1535) opened great new and almost surely unanticipated vistas in
the law of property and Pells v. Brown,0 which in 1620 established
4. HotwS, Law and the Court, in CoLLErED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 296 (1913).
5. Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 2, at 478.
6. Id. at 465.
7. See the discussion in GRAY, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 465-79.
8. Less than 50 years ago, Professor Gray said as to questions of remoteness that,
"there is for them a definite recognized rule: if a decision agrees with it, it is right;
if it does not agree with it, it is wrong." GRAY, THm RuLE ACA NST PEnPErurrls ix
(3d ed. 1915).
9. 1535, 27 Henry VIII, c. 10.
10. Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620). "Millions upon millions, probably billions
upon billions, of property have gone to persons to whom they would not have gone, if
two of the judges of the majority had agreed with their brother. GnAY, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 509.
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the indestructible character of the executory interest, was almost
certainly the major antecedent of the Rule Against Perpetuities, and
in all probability was also the progenitor of the rule first laid down
in 1670 that a future interest capable of taking effect as a contingent
remainder shall never be construed as an executory devise." By 1833
the Rule Against Perpetuities was crystallized.12 Today perpetuity
reform is on the march,'13 the rule of destructibility of contingent
remainders has been abolished in most states 14 and the Rule in Shel-
ley's Case has likewise all but vanished.' 5 In addition, a number of
statutes affecting the title clogging habits of possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry are in force and marketable title acts are becoming
respectable.'6 Thus, it cannot be said that there has been repose
even in the law of future interests. Indeed, a great deal of what
some might call the "substantive" law of future interests is either
no longer with us or is nearing departure, and one may venture to
suggest that the law of future interests is at least veering toward the
point predicted in a more general way by Holmes, 17 "when the part
played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small,
and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a
study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring
them."
C. And What of the Future?
It may be expected that with the diminution of formalism in the
law generally, and in particular in the law of future interests through
the elimination or modification of rules of property designed to de-
feat intention, greater attention will be given by courts and by the
profession to achieving what are conceived to be basic objectives-
of which, no matter how significant its past, the preservation of form
for its own sake is no longer one. This could constitute a return to
11. This facet of the rule of destructibility of contingent remainders apparently
originated in Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Wins. Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (1670).
See GRAy, op. cit. supra note 8, § 920. The other facet of the rule of destructibility
was of course the requirement that a contingent remainder must take effect, if at all,
eo instanti at the ending of the supporting estate of freehold.
12. Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833).
13. See, summarizing the literature and statutes concerning reform of the common
law rule, ABA SECTIoN OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAw, PEnPEqurry
LEGISLATMON HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1962).
14. For a summary of state statutes, see Snrss & SmrrH, THE LAw OF FurrtuE
INTEREmTS § 207 (2d ed. 1956).
15. Id. § 1563.
16. See LEACH & LOGAN, CASES ON Forrm= INTERESTs AND ESTATE PLANNING
68-78 (1961), where some of the legislation is summarized and where the important
literature concerning these subjects is cited. See also BASYE, CLEAING LAND TrrLES
(1953); SirrEs & TAYLOR, THE I ROWvEmENT OF CONVETANcINc By LEGISLATION
(1960).
17. Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 2, at 474.
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pursuit of the Questing Beast, but it need not, since the quarry is
somewhat nearer at hand at least for the future which most of us
are willing to foresee.'8 For as long as we recognize the institution
of property and its concomitants, the rights to transmit property
gratuitously during lifetime and at death and to create future inter-
ests in it, the basic stated objective of the law is likely to be what
it has for some time said to have been-to give effect to "intention."
To state the objective in this orthodox fashion is simple enough, but
as a guide to methods of interpretation the statement is useless be-
cause "intention" is a fugitive very nearly as elusive as the Questing
Beast himself. Since actual intention is never absolutely ascertain-
able, and is often not reasonably inferable, it would be more correct
to say that the objective to be sought in the law of future interests
is to attach to the words and facts at hand a meaning which emerges
from the appropriate admixture of all of the ingredients of the
interpretive process.
II. ELEmENTS OF THE INTERPRETIW PROCESS
A. Language
Although, as we have seen, the law of future interests is gradually
losing its appeal of absolutism through the rejection of unbending
rules of property, it has another appeal of which it is unlikely to be
deprived-the allure of language. This magnetic force must be
watched and contained, since words can become as despotic as
substantive dogma. Indeed, those who find fascination in the law
of future interests should be wary of being entrapped by the illusion
that words are an end in themselves. This is a notion not difficult
to entertain if one reasons that language, together with man's in-
tellect, have long been supposed to distinguish the human species,
at least anthropologically, from the "lesser inhabitants" of the
earth;19 that the most significant use of language from the point of
view of man's destiny apparently lies in the expression and conserva-
tion of ideas; and that the special essence of drafting and interpreting
documents creating future interests is the statement and preservation
of conceptual thought. The reasoning is of course fallacious because
much if not all of the law is a matter of words20 and the law of
18. For a vigorous and by no means altogether obsolete defense of the right of
bequest from a sociological point of view, see StmrzEa, The Challenge of Facts, in
THE CHALL E OF FACTs AND Omtra EssAys 17, 42-44 (1914). Communists, ob-
viously, do not agree. And Holmes, essentially conservative in his personal views, could
envision with no great alarm a society in which the institution of property was greatly
modified. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918). Yet, absent what
sociologists call "survival value," it is doubtful that "trusts" and "future interests" could
have persisted as long as they have.
19. HooToN, Up FRom THE APE 157, 164-74 (1931).
20. Cf. Commissioner v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., 74 F.2d 242, 247 (2d Cir.
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future interests has no monopoly on the use of language as one of
its most important tools. Moreover, language, though highly im-
portant, is only one element of the interpretive process and it is a
fallible one at that.
Words, like numbers, are symbols and, as such, if precisely and
expertly used, may be nearly perfectly descriptive of things or ideas
or combinations of both. But, as Mr. Vaughn Hawkins pointed out
in a farsighted paper delivered more than one hundred years ago,
words, as one of the signs or marks of intention, have their own
inherent limitations:
The failure of language adequately to convey the intention may take place
from three causes: first, the imperfection of language in itself, considered
as a code of signals, its want of definite signification, and its inadequacy
to the expression of every phase of thought; secondly, from the improper
and unskillful use of language by the writer; thirdly, from the limited
nature of the human mind, incapable of foreseeing all contingencies to
which the expression of its intent may require to be adapted, especially
if the interpretation of the writing take place at a period long after that
at which it was composed .... The usages of the same words at different
times, in different places, by different writers, vary greatly. No words but
technical words have their connotation or denotation precisely determined
by authority; the classification and fixing of meanings belongs to a very
important but little studied subject which may be called the theory of
dictionaries; but, were that theory far more perfect than it is, language
would be and would always continue inadequate to meet the perpetually
increasing complexities of human circumstances and human thought.
21
It is indeed true that the range of human ideas and intentions ex-
ceeds man's vocabulary, it is therefore little wonder that an instru-
ment of gift often fails to express the maker's whole intent.22
Considering language, as Mr. Hawkins does and as we all must,
as one set of marks or signs of intention, it is also apparent that no
group of words, in and of itself, can ever express intention; words
unrelated to some standard and to some identifying reference are
meaningless.23 As Dean Wigmore put it:
1934). "I am quite aware that this is all largely [a] matter of words, but so is much
of the law of property .... (Learned Hand, J.)
21. Hawkins, On the Principles of Legal Interpretation, With Reference Especially
to the Interpretation of Wils, 2 JuR. Soc. PAs'Fxs 298, 307 (1860).
22. Cf. Schuyler, Future Interests in Illinois: Current Maturities and Some Futures,
50 Nw. U.L. REv. 457, 535 (1955). But see 2 SniFs, TnE LAw OF FUrtRE INTERESTS
§ 308 (1st ed. 1936). "It is almost inconceivable that a testator should desire to
make a lawful disposition of his property which would be beyond the capacity of the
English language to express."
23. "In every case the words used must be translated into things and facts by
parol evidence." Doherty v. Hill, 144 Mass. 465, 468, 11 N.E. 581, 583 (1887).
Per Holmes, J., who, however, was not very liberally inclined toward allowing
deviations from the normal meaning of language: "[T]he testator .. .is required
14111964 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Instead of the fallacious notion that "there should be interpretation only
when it is needed," the fact is that there must always be interpretation.
Perhaps the range of search need not be extensive, and perhaps the applica-
tion of the document will be apparent at the first view; but there must
always be a traveling out of the document, a comparison of its words
with people and things. The deed must be applied "physically to the
ground."24
Although we may argue about whether we are seeking to discover
"intention," or "sense, or the "inducement" to the words, 25 the fact
will remain that, whatever label we use, we shall discover nothing
if there is nothing to which we can relate the words. A very simple
example would be an outright bequest "to my son." The testator's
"intention," indeed even his "meaning," cannot be determined with
any assurance unless we know whether he has a son and who he is.
A more rollicking example is quoted in one of Dean Wigmore's
little gems: "'My duty, sir, to find out his meaning!' exclaimed Lord
Alvanley. 'Suppose the will had contained only these words, "Fustun
funnidos tantaraboo"; am I to find out the meaning of his gib-
berish?' "2
This brings us to the question of what standards are available to
impart meaning to the words used by the maker of a gift and to
facilitate discovery of the "sense" in which they are used. As used
here, the term "standard" refers to some standard of interpretation
of the sense in which the language in an instrument of gift is em-
ployed. Dean Wigmore suggests three which may be applicable in
the interpretation of wills: (1) that of the normal users of the
language of the forum, the community at large, represented by the
ordinary meaning of words, (2) the standard of a special class of
persons within the community (e.g., lawyers) who use certain words
... to express his commands in writing, and that means that his words must be
sufficient for the purpose when taken in the sense in which they would be used by
the normal speaker of English under his circumstances." Holmes, The Theory of
Legal Interpretation, 12 HAIv. L. REv. 417, 420 (1899). And see SIMEs, op. cit. supra
note 22, § 306.
24. 9 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 2470 (3d ed. 1940).
25. The old theory was that we sought "meaning" as distinguished from "intent."
See 9 WIGMORF, op. cit. supra note 24, § 2459; Hawkins, supra note 21, at 303.
Dean Wigmore says that we should distinguish between "Will" and "Sense." He
urges that "Will," to utter a given word, can seldom be considered for juristic purposes,
but "Sense" can usually be given full effect if it can be ascertained. 9 WxczNonE, op.
cit. supra, § 2459. Hawkins points out that, "the intent, which is the ultimate object
of inquiry, can never be the subject of immediate knowledge, but must ... be inferred
. . . with a greater or less degree of probability." Hawkins, supra note 21, at 310.
Simes seems to agree when he says that, "when we say we are determining the testa-
tot's intent, we mean his probable intent." 2 Snmss, op. cit. supra note 22, § 307. Kales
speaks, obscurely, of the "inducement" to the testator's "legal act of using certain words
according to some standard." KALES, EsTATEs, FuTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CoN-
DiToNs AND RESTRAmTS IN ILLINOiS ch. VII (2d ed. 1920).
26. 9 WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 24, § 2461 n.10.
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in a sense common to the entire class, but different from that of the
community at large, and (3) the individual standard of the maker
of the will (e.g., a manner of expression peculiar to the testator). 27
The relative significance of these standards and what evidence may
be admissible to determine which one or more may be employed are
fully discussed by Mr. Wigmore 28 and there is no need to repeat or
summarize his discussion since we are here only incidentally con-
cerned with rules of evidence. It is enough to reiterate that the
language of the instrument is incapable of interpretation unless a
standard of interpretation is adopted. The standard may simply be
the normal use of language, but standard there must be.
It has been suggested above that there must be not only a stand-
ard of interpretation of language, but also that words are not meaning-
ful absent some "identifying reference." That term may overlap the
term "standard," but as used here it also has a distinct meaning, i.e.,
there must be some way, from the language of the instrument being
construed or from admissible extrinsic evidence, of identifying what
objects, persons, ideas, or concepts are being described. If the identi-
fying reference is not to be found in or inferred from the instrument,
the interpreter will be quite unable to interpret unless admissible
extrinsic evidence, combined with the language of the instrument,
reveals the sense or probable intention sought to be conveyed. Here,
then, is another circumscription of the competency of language, or,
perhaps more accurately put, an instance of "the improper and un-
skillful use of language" mentioned by Mr. Hawkins. This type of
foible is especially likely to occur in future interests cases where the
very creation of a future interest involves (as is frequently the case)
an idea or concept, rather than a person or thing. A single example
will suffice. Suppose a deed to the donor's son, A, for life, remainder
to A's children, and if none survives him to his sisters.29 A never has
any children and all his sisters predecease him. The question is
whether the future interests pass as a part of the sisters' estates. The
concept is transmissibility; the marks or signs afforded by the language
above are inadequate; there is no effective identifying reference. Had
the maker of the gift, instead of referring to A's "sisters," identified
them as "such of my daughters as may be living at A's death," or as
"my daughters, now born or born before A's death, they to take a trans-
missible interest," the identifying reference would have been far
more effective. It would not have been perfect because it might or
might not identify illegitimates or daughters by adoption.
27. Id. § 2458.
28. Id. §§ 2460-67. Holmes apparently would not ordinarily have permitted resort
to any standard but the normal meaning of language. See the quotation, supra note 23.
29. Cf. Hofing v. Willis, 31 1ll.2d 365, 201 N.E.2d 852 (Sept. 1964).
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Enough has been said to indicate that language, though it may be
highly effective, is never quite enough to make the art of interpreta-
tion exact. However, the more precise the wording, the smaller the
margin for error.
B. Rules of Construction
Although it is repeatedly asserted that intent is the polestar in
construction cases, that no will has a twin brother and that one mans
nonsense is not to be construed by another man's nonsense, the fact
remains that there has been developed over the years a vast body
of authority to which resort is often had in the interpretive process.a0
Frequent consistent judicial construction of similar expressions tends
to infuse them with a definite and fixed meaning. When this has
clearly occurred it is not difficult to select as a standard of interpreta-
tion Wigmore's second suggestion, i.e., the standard of a special class
of persons within the community, though it must be admitted that in
future interests cases it is no easy matter to determine whether a
given "rule of construction" has acquired an integrity of its own.
However, this is true in other areas of the law and, even in connec-
tion with rules of construction, "There are many principles or rules
or concepts so specific that the play of discretion in applying them
is greatly reduced, though seldom absent altogether."31
Eminent writers have differed in their appraisal of the utility of
rules of construction. Mr. Hawkins expressed some doubt as to the
expediency of rules of construction as contrasted with principles of
construction. 2 Professor Gray referred to the "unsatisfactory char-
acter of many of the rules for the interpretation of wills. . ...33
Professor Kales thought that "authorities are of first importance in
determining what shall be taken as the primary meaning of words
and phrases," but that authorities "cited for.., general propositions
are obviously of the least value in controlling the ultimate conclusion
in the case."m He further suggested that "the only cases that can be
regarded as controlling are those where a single phrase or word in a
regular form has been ruled upon or ruled upon repeatedly."35 Pro-
fessor Simes regards rules of construction "like the laws of intestacy"
which take care of a situation for which a decedent "failed to make
30. See, e.g., HAwKiNs, WILLS (3d ed. 1925); JARmAN, WILLS (8th ed. 1951).
General rules of construction are set out in chapter LVII of the third volume of Mr.
Jarman's work and in chapter I of Mr. Hawkins' work.
31. Cardozo, Jurisprudence, 55 REPOrT OF N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 263, 281 (1932).
32. Hawkins, supra note 21, at 330.
33. GRAy, op. cit. supra note 2, § 705.
34. KALEs, op. cit. supra note 25, at 152, 153. Cf. Schaefer, Intent of the Testator,
in ABA PRocEEDINcs OF PROBATE AND TnusT LAW DIvISIONS, SECTION or REAL
PRoPERTY, PROBATE AND TRuST LAw, 5, 7 (1953).
35. KALEs, op. cit. supra note 25, at 154.
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adequate testamentary provision .. ,"36 He regards many such rules
as means of effectuating policy and sometimes as fulfilling the lowly
role of "a mere arbitrary method of deciding the case, of somewhat
more dignified and judicial character than tossing a coin or rolling
dice."
3 7
It certainly is true that many rules of construction, e.g., at least
several of those relating to the esoteric concept of vesting m are of little
if any use except as rationalizations of results already assured. It like-
wise seems true that most rules of construction shed almost no light
on intention except where they have been relied upon in the drafts-
manship of an instrument. But where a case can go one way or the
other, and where a rule of construction which through long usage
has acquired a hard core may tip the scale, perhaps rules of con-
struction should be accorded "such an element of certainty that ...
prediction ceases to be hazardous for the trained and expert judg-
ment." 39 Mr. Hawkins has said it another way:
By the combined result of the decisions of a succession of judges, each
bringing his mind to bear on the views of those who preceded him, a
system of interpretation is built up, which is likely to secure a much nearer
approach to perfect justice than if each interpreter were left to set up his own
standard of how far it was right to go in supplying the defective expression,
or of what amounted to a conviction of the intent as distinguished from mere
speculative conjecture.
40
C. Inference and Extrinsic Evidence
Interpretation, in its ordinary sense, must be based on inference
even when the intention of the maker of a gift appears to be abso-
lutely unambiguously stated. On the other hand, interpretation
stops in the absence of any marks or signs from which intent can be
inferred. Interpretation (again in its ordinary sense) "can be carried
only so far as the intent can be collected with sufficient probability."41
Of course there are many cases where courts purport to interpret
intent when the testator's mind has never worked upon the problem
at hand. In such instances the word "interpretation" must be con-
sidered as comprehending the formation of a judgment for the testator
since he could have had no intention concerning something that never
36. 2 Sams, op. cit. supra note 22, at § 309.
37. Id. at 19-20. Cf. LLEWVELLYN, TAE CommoN LAw TRADrIoN 189 (1960).
"[T]he rules of law, alone, do not, because they cannot, decide any appealed case
which has been worth both an appeal and a response."
38. Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?, 56 MICH. L.
REv. 683, 887, 896-917 (1958).
39. Cardozo, supra note 31.
40. Hawkins, supra note 21, at 329. And see GRAY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 705;
KALm, op. cit. supra note 25, at 154.
41. Hawkins, supra note 21, at 313.
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occurred to him. For the moment, however, we are concerned with
inferences in the interpretative process-inferences to be drawn from
the instrument being construed itself and from extrinsic evidence.
At one end of the spectrum the probability of correctness of in-
ferences may be overwhelming. Suppose, for example, the case where
a testator has given "to my son A for life, remainder to my heirs at
law technically determined at the date of my death, intending hereby
to include A as a remainderman." At the testator's death he has
three heirs at law, A, B, and C. The question is whether, at A's
death, one-third of the property passes as a part of A's estate. The
conclusion that it does is nearly assured. We say the instrument is
unambiguous; what we are doing is inferring at least (1) a standard
of interpretation, (2) that the will was in all probability drawn by a
lawyer, and (3) that the testator meant what he said when he
specifically expressed his intention. Even if the last phrase-the
declaration of intention-were omitted, and though extrinsic evidence
showed that A was the testator's sole heir, the property would
probably pass as a part of A's estate; the competing inference that A
was not to take any part of the fee would be unlikely to prevail
over the very strong inference to be drawn from the language itself.
Between the two ends of the spectrum fall more difficult cases
where the inference from language is less compelling, but where
inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence, combined with the
language of the gift, tend toward reasonable probability of correct
results. Here might fall a case where the testator gives to "my son A,
and-when he dies title shall shift to Memorial Hospital." Extrinsic evi-
dence shows that A was a bachelor fifty years old and a spendthrift
and that although the testator knew of A's profligacy he was fond of
him. Extrinsic evidence also shows that the testator had founded
Memorial Hospital, that he was very active in its affairs and that he
had been President of its Board of Trustees when he made the will
and at his death. There is a statute which dispenses with the need
for words of inheritance in devising a fee and the jurisdiction where
this will is construed inflexibly follows the rule that a fee cannot be
given over after a fee on an event certain to occur. Therefore, if A
gets the fee, the Hospital can take nothing; if he has only a life
estate, the gift over to the Hospital is valid. From the language we
can infer that (1) the will was ineptly drafted, (2) the testator
meant for the property to go to the Hospital when A died, and (3)
the phraseology of the gift over seems to presuppose a prior fee and
not a life estate in A. From the extrinsic evidence we can strongly
infer that (1) the testator did not want A to have an absolute estate,
and (2) Memorial Hospital was a preferred object of the testator's
1416 [ VOL. 17
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bounty. On balance, the combination of inferences would indicate
to many that despite the statute and the rule of repugnancy, A should
be held to take a life estate. Of course, a judge rigidly imbued with
the sanctity of rules of property could reach an opposite result on
the basis of the will alone.
At the far end of the spectrum fall those cases where probable
intention cannot be collected from language and extrinsic evidence
or either. An event has happened which the testator did not antici-
pate. Such a case is the example earlier given where the grantor's
son is given a life estate and if he dies without children then to the
son's sisters. The only extrinsic evidence shows that A died without
children after the grantor and that all of A's sisters predeceased him.
No "intention" as to the transmissibility of the sisters' interests is
ascertainable nor is a probable intention even inferable. "[A]ny solu-
tion is bound to be verbal and indeed formal."4 And it is nearly
certain to be influenced by one or more of the intangible forces later
discussed which form so important a part in the interpretive process
viewed, as it must be, as an art.
The subject of inference and extrinsic evidence should not be
dropped without brief comment on the function of extrinsic evidence
in construction cases. We have already seen that interpretation is
dependent in all cases on extrinsic evidence in greater or lesser
degree. Its admissibility has been enormously liberalized over the
years because of recognition of the principle that the "words of a
document are never anything but indices to extrinsic things, and that
therefore all the circumstances must be considered which go to make
clear the sense of the words,-that is their associations with things."43
True, limitations on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence have not
been altogether eliminated; the rule against "disturbing a clear
meaning" persists to some extent and the rule prohibiting in most
instances the admission of direct declarations of intention is not
likely soon to be eliminated.45 Yet many of the thoughtful views
expounded more than a century ago by Mr. Francis Morgan Nichols4
are gaining acceptance.
Most discussions concerning the role of extrinsic evidence in inter-
preting wills concern themselves with descriptions of things and
people. It must never be overlooked that in interpreting dispositions
of future interests we are as much interested in ideas and concepts
42. Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 292 Fed. 303, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)
(Learned Hand, J.).
43. 9 WGMOBF, op. cit. supra note 24, § 2470.
44. Id. §§ 2461-63.
45. Id. §§ 2471-75.
46. Nichols, On the Rules Which Ought to Govern the Admission of Extrinsic Evi-
dence in the Interpretation of Wills, 2 Jur. Soc. PAPEIs 351 (1860).
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as we are in things and persons. For this reason, in future interests
cases, extrinsic evidence may play an even more important role.
Facts have a way of shedding light on ideas that are not or cannot
be exactly described by words and we can discern a healthy recog-
nition of this in the steady erosion of ancient shibboleths. However,
care should be taken to keep evidence in construction suits within
appropriate bounds of relevance, practically and reasonableness.
And, despite the limits of language, few would argue that extrinsic
evidence should, except in rare instances, influence results to the
point where the words used will not bear the meaning attached to
them by the interpreter.47
D. judgment
The all-important element in the interpretive process in difficult
cases is of course judgment. Judgment is a composite of many intangi-
bles. Judgment is mastery of technique or at all events the capacity
and diligence to master it. Judgment is an enlightened recognition of
the importance of history and tradition. Judgment is precedent and
the ability logically to apply it where it should be applied. Judgment
is the impact of facts and the expertise, within limits, to recognize and
apply techniques which will produce the result called for when the
facts are not neutral. Judgment is wisdom, patience, and foresight.
Judgment is, imagination, courage, and integrity. Judgment is film-
ness tempered by compassion, sensitivity and understanding. judg-
ment is the mores and sometimes mere custom. Judgment is philoso-
phy, training, and background. Judgment is sociology, economics,
psychology-perhaps a blend of all the social sciences. Judgment is
flexibility and adaptability to change when change is indicated. Judg-
ment is morality, equity, and justice as best we can approximate these.
Judgment is experience.
The advocate who is called upon to predict a result in a particular
case must take account of these abstract components and he must also
evaluate the possibility of the partial or total absence of some, and
the presence of the antithesis of others. For judgment may be (though
it not often is) lack of intellectual capacity, ignorance, indolence,
petulance, prejudice, idiosyncrasy, and lack of imagination or some
one or more of these. Fortunately, although the title "Judge" is not
synonomous with "justice," very few of our judges are afflicted with
47. See Hawkins, supra note 21, at 326: "[Tlhe meaning of the words cannot be
added to or corrected beyond a certain point, or the words cease to be capable of
bearing the interpretation put upon them; and, though the intent be known [strongly
inferable?], there is no expression in which it can clothe itself. . . [L ]egal interpreta-
tion is not a mere ascertaining of the intent; it acts only by putting a meaning, con-
sistent with the [probable?] intent, upon the words." Cf. KALES, op. cit. supra note
25, § 151.
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these baser qualities. Indeed, many years of experience at the bar
leads to the belief that most judges strive, with or without direct
consciousness of their striving, toward Cardozo's "definition" of
judgment:
So also the duty of a judge becomes itself a question of degree, and he is
a useful judge or a poor one as he estimates the measure accurately or
loosely. He must balance all his ingredients, his philosophy, his logic, his
analogies, his history, his customs, his sense of right, and all the rest,
and adding a little here and taking out a little there, must determine, as
wisely as he can, which weight shall tip the scales. If this seems a weak
and inconclusive summary, I am not sure that the fault is mine. I know
he is a wise pharmacist who from a recipe so general can compound a
fitting remedy. But the like criticism may be made of most attempts to
formulate the principles which regulate the practice of an art. . . . After
the wearisome process of analysis has been finished, there must be for
every judge a new synthesis which he will have to make for himself. The
most that he can hope for is that with long thought and study, with years
of practice at the bar or on the bench, and with the aid of that inward
grace which comes now and again to the elect of any calling, the analysis
may help a little to make the synthesis a true one.
48
III. CLASSIFICATION FOR INTERPRETIVE PUIPOSES
A. Limitations and Utility
No student of future interests could be foolish enough to suppose
that all cases involving interpretation could or should be minutely
classified. This would lead to a return to rigid formalism. However,
some broad classifications clearly assert themselves and these have
the merit of narrowing the areas in which the interpretive process
must rest on a highly complex mixture of intangibles. To the extent
that those areas can be limited, certainty and repose are fostered and
litigation, fruitless for one side or the other unless compromised,
49
is discouraged. Hence, with full awareness of their limitations and
of inevitable overlapping between and among them, some broad
classifications are suggested in the belief that they may be of aid to
the interpreter in assessing the relative importance of the factors
involved in the interpretive process.
48. CARDozo, op. cit. supra note 2, at 161-63.
49. For a suggestion that courts should perhaps have the power to compromise
cases by resort to multi-part rules, see Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Com-
promise, 58 Nw. U.L. Rv. 750 (1964). Professor Noonan suggests that a discretionary
power to impose compromises may have a special value in will construction cases. A
Symposium on Philosophy from Law: Compromise and Decision Making in the
Resolution of Controversies, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 795, 800-01 (1964). The present writer
has strong reservations, especially if the compromise is to be allowed any force as a
precedent. Id. at 802.
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B. Cases Where "Intention" Is Stated Clearly
Though intention is a state of mind and must therefore always be
inferred, there are cases where, recognizing this, it is only a harmless
distortion to say that intention has been clearly stated. When an
instrument (1) is phrased in precise language which is or should be
understandable in terms of a readily ascertainable standard by those
charged with administering it and those who benefit by it, (2) con-
tains identifying references which, considered in the light of extrinsic
evidence, are unmistakable, and (3) anticipates by its terms the
happening of the event which has precipitated disagreement and
provides what is then to happen, the instrument may fairly be said
to be unambiguous and the maker's intention is ascertainable in the
ordinary sense in which those terms are used.
Suppose (1) a gift to A for life, remainder to such of his children
as are living at his death and the then living descendants per stirpes
of such of A's children as are not living at A's death, (2) A has three
children two of whom die before A, each leaving a child who survives
A, and (3) A's third child also predeceases A leaving no children,
but a spouse who survives A. The language and the facts will make
it very difficult indeed for anyone to say that the spouse of the
third child should take anything upon the events that have happened.
The spouse may be avaricious, in dire need or represented by in-
competent counsel, or all three, but whatever lures her into the
courthouse, she should be abruptly treated. So it should be in any
similarly clearcut case, unless it is no longer clearcut because time may
have altered or obscured the symbolism of the words.
C. Cases Where Resort to Rules of Construction Is Appropriate
Somewhat more difficult are cases involving the use of terms or
types of gifts which are themselves ambiguous but which have
acquired a settled meaning through usage. Suppose the gift in re-
mainder in the example discussed in the preceding paragraph had
been to A's children and if any shall die leaving children then to such
children and if any shall die without children then to the surviving
children. On the same set of facts the spouse, as the heir or devisee
of the child last to die, may or may not have a good claim to one-third
of the property depending upon whether the taking effect of the gift
over is or is not regarded as a part of the divesting contingency. 50
The testator has either not thought about the matter or if he has
50. The apparent conflict on this question between Blomfield v. Eyre, 5 C.B. 713,
136 Eng. Rep. 1058 (1848), and Jackson v. Noble, 2 Keen 590, 48 Eng. Rep. 755 (1838),
evoked much discussion. The Blomield case found favor, sub silentio, in the famous
case of O'Maboney v. Burdett, 7 Eng. & Ir. App. Cas. 388 (1874). The point arises
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there is nothing in the will nor any extrinsic evidence from which
probable intent may be inferred. Adherence to a rule of construction,
if one is established when the matter arises, will resolve the dilemma
Many similarly soluble questions may arise with even greater
frequency. Where there is an immediate gift, or a gift of a future
interest in fee, followed by a gift over on the "death" or "death
without issue" of the first taker, the word "death" requires interpreta-
tion because it is not expressly related to any point of time. Where
there is a gift to a class, those to be comprehended within its terms
must be determined unless the time for closing the class is specified.
A gift, without more, to a group of persons "or to the survivors or
survivor" of them demands that the court decide who must survive
whom or who must survive what point of time in order to qualify
as a taker. Property given to the descendants of several persons or
even to the descendants of one person must be distributed either per
stirpes or per capita and, if per stirpes, the court may also have to
determine at what generation the stirps or roots begin.
It is plain, if only from the volume of decisions, that dispositions
of the kinds mentioned here, as well as numerous other kinds, fall
into patterns and continue to be drafted without requisite accuracy.
Each time this occurs, intent (which may or may not be lacking) is
unascertainable. In such cases, if what we might call a mature rule of
construction is established, its application, in the absence of com-
pelling extrinsic evidence to the contrary, will bid as fair to produce
a result which the testator would have wanted as will the pure guess
of the court. Adherence to the rule, unless it is deemed bad from a
policy standpoint, or unless it has outworn its utility,5' will assist the
profession m advising would-be litigants and should help to curtail
litigation. Vacillation will have the opposite effect.52
It will be noted that adherence to rules of construction in certain
situations may impart a sufficient degree of certainty into otherwise
ambiguous phraseology to enable some dispositions, not otherwise
eligible, to be classified in a sense as cases where "intent" is stated
clearly. Especially would this be true if there were grounds for
often enough to warrant a strong rule one way or the other. See, for example,
McGlothlin v. MeElvain, 407 IMI. 142, 95 N.E.2d 68 (1950), commented on, 30 CM.-
KENT L. REv. 1, 80 (1951); 39 ILL. B.J. 388 (1951); 46 ILL. REv. 776 (1951);
Dusenberry v. Johnson, 59 N.J. Eq. 336, 45 Ad. 103 (ch. 1899).
51. Cf. discussion of the venerable rule that "the law favors the early vesting of
estates." Schuyler, Drafting, Tax, and Other Consequences of the Rule of Early Vest-
ing, 46 ILL. L. REV. 407 (1951).
52. See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 317. "[W]hat many judges are setting up
against the rules of construction is, not their opinion of what testators really intended,
but their guess as to what the testators would have intended if they had thought
about the point in question, which they did not, a guess resting often upon the most
trifling balance of considerations."
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inferring that a particular expression had been used in reliance on a
rule of construction. This would be but one instance of overlapping
between classifications, but it is enough to show that these groupings
are at most aids in and not elements of the process of interpretation.
D. Cases Where Intention, Unstated, May Be Inferred
With a Greater or Lesser Degree of Probability
Cases which may fall within this group are as diverse as those
which the first group may embrace. Here, as in instances where
rules of construction are applied, we are dealing with situations
which the testator did not contemplate, or cannot be said to have
contemplated. We are in a way deciding what a dead man would
have done if he had thought about something that he didn't think
about, but we have grounds for supposing our conclusion to be
correct as to what he would have done, i.e., what his probable intent
was or what his intent would have been.
Suppose, for example, that a testator gives property to his wife
for life, and at her death to his children, or their issue, and if any
of the children die leaving no issue, then to the "surviving" children,
or their issue. All three children predecease the widow, the first
two leaving issue who survive the widow, the last to die leaving no
issue. The issue of the children who died first could claim all of the
property if their parents had happened to be "surviving" children,
but in the event which has occurred they will get at most an intestate
portion of the "share" of the child who died last unless "surviving"
does not really mean "surviving" and is read "other." The inference
is very strong that no rational testator would, under the circumstances,
want his grandchildren's share to depend upon the accident of a
parent surviving his brother or sister;53 the probability is very great
that the testator "would have wanted" the word "other" to be sub-
stituted for "surviving," especially if there were an ultimate gift over
if all of the children died without issue.
In acceleration cases, where the testator has not stated what should
happen if his spouse renounces, what he probably would have wanted
is often inferable. Trustees of Kenyon College v. Cleveland Trust
Co.,m is a good example. The will gave the testatrix's husband a life
interest in an estate of approximately 600,000 dollars, and upon his
death 300,000 dollars was to go in specified amounts to certain persons.
The balance was to go to Kenyon College. Testatrix's husband re-
nounced the life estate and elected to take one-half of the estate. If
the money gifts were accelerated the takers would have the benefit
of their gifts immediately and the college would get nothing. The
53. Cf. Wake v. Varah, 2 Ch. D. 348, 354 (1876).
54. 130 Ohio St. 107, 196 N.E. 784 (1935).
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income from the one-half of the estate left after renunciation was
directed to be sequestered and accumulated for the benefit of the
college during the renouncing husband's lifetime. The inference
that the testatrix would have preferred this to immediate payment
of the money gifts and complete exclusion of the college, almost
surely a preferred object of her bounty, is nearly irrefutable. Other
equitable solutions could be found and they might be as good or
better, but it is as nearly certain as anything can be that "probable
intention under the circumstances" was better served by the method
adopted than if the money gifts had been accelerated because they
were "vested."
Many other examples of the reasonable inference of what a testator
would have wanted had he considered an event for which he did not
provide might be suggested. Of these a large proportion would be far
less common than the examples given and quite a few might be
unique or almost so. In the solutions discussed, the treatment of
"survivor" as "other," and resort to sequestration in aid of a dis-
appointed taker, the techniques approach the application of a rule
of construction, so those cases to some extent overlap the "rule of
construction" classification of cases. As inferences of probable "in-
tent" become less clear, and as more unfamiliar ground appears in
the situation presented for decision, the intangibles of judgment
assume greater and greater importance.
E. Cases Where No Probable Intention Can Be Inferred and
Where No Rule of Construction Presents a Solution
Professor Gray said that,
When the judges say they are interpreting the intention of a testator, what
they are doing, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, is deciding what shall
be done with his property on contingencies which he did not have in
contemplation. . . .What the judges have to do is, in truth, to say what
shall be done where the testator has had no real intention. .... .5
Of course there are far more cases than one in every hundred (the
reference was no doubt a figure of speech) which do not involve mat-
ters which the testator has not thought about at all. Indeed in the
many cases reaching a conclusion as to probable intention (using the
term in the sense of "intention inferable with a reasonable degree of
probability even though not clearly expressed or clearly inferable"),
the very process of inferring the probable intention presupposes some
prior consideration by the testator of the matter in issue, because there
can be no intention, actual or probable, concerning something on
which the mind has not worked. But there are many cases, as we have
already seen, including many of those where it has been deemed
55. GRAuY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 316.
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appropriate to invoke rules of construction, where no intention at all
can be inferred. This may be the result of hopeless ambiguity or it
may be the result of sheer failure to anticipate an event. It is to that
group of cases, exclusive of those inviting the application of rules of
construction, that attention is at this point focused.
This is the greyest area of interpretation. It may involve cases
where the will is drawn in ambiguous and unfamiliar terms unsuscep-
tible of the application of any known standard. It may involve situa-
tions where the will is "home-made" or drawn by an incompetent
lawyer. It may involve cases where completely unanticipated events
have occurred and where it is impossible with any degree of proba-
bility to infer what the testator would have wanted. In this area the
courts are faced with their most difficult problems of interpretation;
indeed they are not "interpreting" in any true sense, for "the process
of interpretation must stop for want of materials .. ..*"" But reach
a decision they must or partially abdicate their function and allow
the law of intestacy to take its course-a result of desperation not
often permitted, quite possibly because in many instances the one
thing that can be clearly inferred is the testator's aversion to intestacy.
These cases force the element of judgment to its very verge, since
so many of the intangibles comprised by that term must be balanced
in achieving results. Under these circumstances widespread agree-
ment on whether a ruling is correct is not to be expected. Straight-
forward recognition of this and of the virtual necessity of forming a
judgment for the testator, as distinguished from feigned discovery of
an intention that never existed, would gain far more respect for the
interpretive process (and for the judicial process) in this type of
case.57 Frustrating as it may be, even the magic of the law stops
where there is nothing over which its wand may be waved.
IV. INTERPRETATION AS AN AiRT
The volume of future interests cases which reaches the appellate
level is formidable but it should not be forgotten that in all likelihood
"a majority ... could not, with semblance of reason, be decided any
way but one."58 Nor should it be overlooked that there must be
56. See Hawkins, supra note 21, at 313.
57. Cf. Matter of Lummis, 101 Misc. 258, 273, 166 N.Y. Supp. 936, 946 (1917).
"An admission that the testator had no real intention upon the question which the
court is resolving by construction is only a frank avowal of what is plainly manifest in
too many cases on wills."
58. CanDozo, op. cit. supra note 2 at 164. Cf. LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 37,
at 189. "Substantially, the more bare rules of law do today manage alone to decide that
obnoxious but persistent body of appeals in which in fact the applicable rules are both
firmly and reasonably settled-often enough reexamined, retested, restated, and re-
affirmed within the past few years-and in which the facts of the case fall so obviously
inside the core of the rule that reasonable judges do not have to ponder."
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numberless relatively uncomplicated future interests cases which are
finally decided at the nisi prius level and many more which are
settled without trial. And while statistics are not available it would
be surprising indeed if it were not so that countless trusts are admin-
istered in this country from inception to termination without resort to
judicial interpretation during the entire period of administration. This
vast group of cases, like millions of transactions daily conducted in the
commercial world, constitute the great underlying portion of the
iceberg. So if you look for certainty in the interpretive process,
there it is-a vast invisible mass in which those to whom repose is
all important may find solace. This great body of cases requires no
interpretation practised as an art. It is in the difficult and novel cases
that the elements of the interpretive process which we have discussed
come into play-the cases that plague the advocates on both sides, the
judges who must decide them, and the students who must seek to
understand them when they find their way, as they have a habit of
doing, into casebooks on the law of future interests.
Let us review briefly what confronts the interpreter in the case
which is not run of the mill. He must look for a standard or standards
of interpretation applicable to the instrument before him. There may
be one or more and differing standards and these may apply to
different portions of the instrument. He must seek identifying refer-
ences and he must determine whether and to what extent these are
adequate to define the things, persons, and ideas which must be
defined. He must determine whether the instrument is one to which
one or more rules of construction might properly be applied. If so,
he must decide whether the rule or rules which might be invoked
are "hard core" rules or merely rules which will help to fortify
a result once reached. He must conclude what extrinsic evidence is
allowable, consider its relevance and its weight. Then he must apply
the processes of logic to discern inferences that may properly be
drawn from the language and extrinsic evidence before him. He must
evaluate the strength of these inferences and, if there are competing
inferences, as there almost surely will be, he must balance these to see
which way the scales shall be tipped. Finally, he must call upon all of
the resources which go to constitute his judgment and come forward
with a conclusion. If he is a judge of a court of review he will be
called upon to give reasons for his ultimate decision and will of neces-
sity have to exercise caution not to ignore the past nor to create some
obscure crevasse in which future litigants may be entrapped. If he
is a lawyer acting as counsellor or advocate, his task, though perhaps
less delicate, will be no less difficult; he has his reputation, his client's
chances of success, and above all his integrity to consider and he can
no more afford to be wrong than the judge. At every step of the way
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the interpreter is confronted with conscious or subconscious choices;
the end is a synthesis of hopefully correct selections and there is no
formula for the decision ultimately extracted from the mixture. Can
anyone say that his calling is not based upon learning, experience,
and every other factor affecting that very real intangible-judgment?
Can anyone say that his calling is not the practise of an art?
It would be impossible adequately to describe an artistic future
interests decision. But, if one were called upon to do so, the specifi-
cations would not differ greatly from those which would apply to
any other artistic legal judgment. Apart from taking account of all
that is suggested in the preceding paragraph, the artistic judgment
will never be mechanical;59 it will display a link between the past
and the present;60 it will recognize relevant social changes; in some
instances it will foreshadow a relatively near-term future; and, in the
rare situations where full play for the art is allowed,61 it will offer a
fleeting glimpse of a far-away future-perhaps long ago pre-ordained-
unbelievable to most, revelationary to some, and inspirational to the
few who grasp its import.
Hand me the antiphlogiston, alchemist, and I shall mix a proper
potion!
59. Hawkins, supra note 21, at 330. "[Interpretation is] a process of reasoning from
probabilities, a process of remedying, by a sort of equitable jurisdiction, the imperfec-
tions of human language and powers of using language, a process whose limits are
necessarily indefinite and yet continually requiring to be practically determined-and
not, as it is not, a mere operation requiring the use of grammars and dictionaries, a
mere inquiry into the meaning of words." Cf. Stone, Man and Machine in the Search
fo-P Justice, 16 Sm,. L. REV. 515, 556-57 (1964). "Men in their search to do justice
seem always to be transcending the drive, methods, and limits of mere intellect. In-
sofar as we delegate this particular search to machines, even by inadvertence, we
shall risk its emasculation to the extent of the incapacity of machines to do what can-
not be intellectualized. . . . The quality of justice done finally depends . . . on the
will exercised and the choice made by the man in the judgment seat."
60. "The goal which we seek is a blend which takes into account in due proportion
the wisdom of the past and the needs of the present." ScHAEFER, PREcEDENT AND
Poracy 21 (1955).
61. But see LLWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 37, at 190. "I hope, and hope hard,
that the present material may make permanently untenable any notion that creativeness
-choice or creation of effective policy by appellate judges-is limited to the crucial
case, the unusual case, the borderline case, the queer case, the tough and exhausting
case, the case that calls for lasting conscious worry. My material aims to put beyond
challenge that such creativeness is instead everyday stuff, almost every-case stuff, and
need not be conscious at all."
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